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Joint operations are the norm in oil and gas ventures around the world. 
Oil and gas exploration and development are expensive and highly risky, 
so investors seek to minimize individual risks by sharing them with others. 
Further, in the United States, leases covering a production area are likely 
to be held by several owners because mineral titles have been fragmented 
historically. For these reasons, it is common to see dozens of working inter-
est owners in a single well in this country.
Joint operations are usually conducted under the terms of an operating 
agreement, a written contract between cotenants or separate owners of oil 
and gas interests setting out their agreement to operate their interests or 
leases as one “contract area.” Practicality is one reason to use an operating 
agreement. The common law defining the rights and obligations of the 
owners of working interests in oil and gas operations is complicated, con-
fusing, and incomplete. Sometimes the law of cotenancy applies, but often 
it does not.1 And when the law of cotenancy applies, its hoary principles 
may not “fit” the modern oil and gas industry.
Furthermore, there are other important reasons for operating agree-
ments, including limited liability and taxation. No investor wants to be 
jointly and severally liable for the torts and contracts of other co-investors. 
Structuring a venture as a corporation brings limited liability but subjects 
it to double taxation and may limit its ability to take advantage of tax 
* Cite as John S. Lowe, “Some Recurring Issues in Operating Agreements and What 
AAPL’s Drafting Committee Might Do About Them,” 60 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 27-1 (2014).
** I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Richard Booth; Tim Dowd; John Grace; Lynn 
Hendrix; Douglas Mills; Professor David Percy; my research assistant, Daniel C. Lunsford; 
my former students Ryan Johnson, James Murphy, Patrick Murphy, Randy Parcel, and R.J. 
Pathroff for their research and analysis, as well as Donna Gaubert, my SMU administrative 
assistant; and Margo MacDonnell and the Foundation staff for their editorial assistance. 
The opinions I express are my own, and do not reflect the opinions of Southern Methodist 
University, SMU’s Dedman School of Law, or the Hutchison Endowment.
1 If working interest owners own undivided interests in the same lease(s), they are cote-
nants. But if they own interests in different leases, they are not cotenants, even if the leases 
are in the same spacing unit. See Come Big or Stay Home, LLC v. EOG Res., Inc., 2012 ND 
91, ¶ 19, 816 N.W.2d 80, 87.
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losses.2 Partnerships are ideal entities for oil and gas development for tax 
purposes since profits and losses flow through to the partners. But partners 
have fiduciary obligations to one another, and from a liability viewpoint, 
partnership is a disaster because partners are jointly and severally liable.3 
Additionally, partnership interests are difficult to convey and relatively 
unmarketable.
Concurrent ownership is traditionally the favored structure for oil and 
gas operations, and it is facilitated by an operating agreement. Under the 
operating agreement, each party owns separate property for tax purposes, 
and the tax results are approximately the same as they are for partners. 
But the liabilities of the non-operating parties are effectively limited to the 
amount of their investments. The operator is an independent contractor, 
liable for its own torts and contractual obligations, not a partner of the 
non-operators.4
Effectively, an operating agreement “pools” leases and fractional interests 
in leases or mineral rights within the defined contract area under the day-
to-day direction of an individual or corporation designated as the “opera-
tor.” This brings additional expertise to the venture and spreads the risks 
of drilling and the cost of operations.5 An operating agreement provides 
a decision-making process, a risk-allocation mechanism, and a financial 
instrument for the parties involved in exploration and production opera-
tions within the contract area.6
2 See Charles O. Galvin, “The ‘Ought’ and ‘Is’ of Oil-and-Gas Taxation,” 73 Harv. L. Rev. 
1441, 1495–96 (1960).
3 See Howard L. Boigon & Christine L. Murphy, “Liabilities of Nonoperating Mineral 
Interest Owners,” 51 U. Colo. L. Rev. 153, 157 (1980) (citing Dana v. Searight, 47 F.2d 38 
(10th Cir. 1931); Riss v. Harvey, 354 P.2d 594 (Colo. 1960); Mikel Drilling Co. v. Dunkin, 
1957 OK 226, 318 P.2d 435).
4 While operating agreements are popularly referred to as “joint operating agreements” 
or “JOAs,” they are structured to avoid classification as partnerships. See id. at 161 (“It is 
well settled that one co-tenant cannot do anything with respect to the common property 
binding upon his co-tenants unless they may have authorized or ratified his act. No agency 
by implication arises out of his act merely from the relationship of co-tenancy.” (quoting 
Tungsten Prods., Inc. v. Kimmel, 105 P.2d 822, 823–24 (Wash. 1940))). See also Taylor v. 
Brindley, 164 F.2d 235, 240 (10th Cir. 1947); Myers v. Crenshaw, 116 S.W.2d 1125, 1129 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1938), aff ’d, 137 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1940)).
5 See Alexander J. Black & Hew R. Dundas, “Joint Operating Agreements: An Interna-
tional Comparison from Petroleum Law,” 8 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 49, 49–50 (1992).
6 See David E. Pierce, “Transactional Evolution of Operating Agreements in the Oil 
and Gas Industry,” Oil and Gas Agreements: Joint Operations 1-1, 1-10 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. 
Fdn. 2008).
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Operating agreements are ubiquitous in the American oil and gas indus-
try. There are nearly one million producing wells in the United States,7 
most of which are subject to at least one operating agreement. Historically, 
oil companies developed their own operating agreement forms, which 
they then exchanged and negotiated over—sometimes not reaching agree-
ment before the property in question stopped producing.8 The inherent 
inefficiency of reinventing the wheel for every drilling venture led to the 
development of the first American Association of Professional Landmen 
(AAPL) Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement in 1956 (AAPL 
Form 610-1956).9 Revised forms followed in 1977, 1982, and 1989.10 The 
AAPL model forms have become the standard in the United States, and 
will be the focus of this chapter.
Interest owners may use a model form as their governing contract or, 
less frequently, as a tool to start the negotiating process to draft their own 
7 In 2009, there were 824,847 producing oil and gas wells in the United States, as com-
pared to about 3,650 in Saudi Arabia. It has been estimated that more than 45,000 new wells 
will be drilled in the United States each year. Since 1950, 2.6 million wells have been drilled 
in the United States. See Webcast, World Oil, “Oil and Gas Forecast 2013” (Feb. 19, 2013).
8 This author was once involved as an expert witness in a dispute in which an entire 
field was developed, produced, plugged, and abandoned, apparently without the parties 
ever agreeing on the terms of an operating agreement. See George W. Hazlett, “Drafting 
of Joint Operating Agreements,” 3 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 277, 277–78 (1957) (noting that 
joint operations were so frequent that almost every company developed its own form of 
agreement to state the rights and obligations of the participants, but these agreements were 
not uniform and the desire of each company to use its own form often created disputes that 
resulted in costly delay and animosity).
9 The process of the development of the AAPL Form 610-1956, which was originally 
published as the “Ross-Martin” Model Form by Kraftbilt, in Tulsa, Oklahoma, is discussed 
at J. O. Young, “Oil and Gas Operating Agreements: Producers 88 Operating Agreements, 
Selected Problems and Suggested Solutions,” 20 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 197, 198–202 (1975). 
See also John R. Reeves & J. Matthew Thompson, “The Development of the Model Form 
Operating Agreement: An Interpretative Accounting,” 54 Okla. L. Rev. 211, 214–16 (2001). 
As noted below at note 23, however, the first organizationally generated model form was the 
Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation’s (RMMLF) Rocky Mountain Unit Operating 
Agreement, Form 1 (Undivided Interest) (RMMLF Form 1), which was published by the 
Foundation in May 1954.
10 There have also been occasional tweaks to the forms. In 1967, the AAPL Form 610-
1956 received cosmetic changes, primarily to reflect that it had been endorsed by the Amer-
ican Association of Petroleum Landmen (now the American Association of Professional 
Landmen), and was no longer a “pure” commercial form. And in 2013, the 1989 model 
form was revised to include horizontal modifications. See Jeff Weems, “Changes Within the 
AAPL 610 - 1989 Model Form Operating Agreement: Horizontal Modifications and Other 
Developments,” 59 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 29-1 (2013).
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operating agreement.11 Parties to onshore oil and gas ventures in the 
United States almost always tailor one of the AAPL model forms;12 rela-
tively minor change is the norm, though all of the AAPL model forms pro-
vide space for additional provisions, which may be lengthy.13 Offshore in 
the United States, the parties typically use one of the AAPL forms designed 
for offshore use; there are two, one adopted in 2002 for Outer Continental 
Shelf use14 and an offshore deepwater version adopted in 2007.15
There are several justifications for the development and use of model 
forms. They provide parties with well-written and comprehensive agree-
ments that reflect industry best practices, reduce negotiation and drafting 
expenses, and allow for efficient interpretation of agreements by develop-
ing interpretative precedents over time.16 But the fact remains that operat-
ing agreements are second only to leases as litigation generators.17 They are 
also second only to leases in the amount of commentary that they attract 
at meetings like this one.18
11 Michael D. Josephson, “Fundamentals of International Joint Operating Agreements,” 
53 Inst. on Oil & Gas L. 17-1, 17-3 (Ctr. for Am. & Int’l L. 2002).
12 While new drilling ventures in the United States generally use the AAPL Form 610-
1989, it is common to see the older forms in use in areas where they were used during 
initial exploration and operations, in the interest of uniformity. Some small operators just 
use the forms that they have become accustomed to using, and some larger companies have 
refused to use the AAPL Form 610-1989, viewing it as insufficiently operator friendly. See 
Lynn P. Hendrix, “The New Model Operating Agreement Forms: Why Change the Rules 
in the Ninth Inning?” Onshore Pooling and Unitization 6-1 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 1997).
13 See AAPL Form 610-1956, at art. 30; AAPL Form 610-1977, at art. XV; AAPL Form 
610-1982, at art. XV; AAPL Form 610-1989, at art. XVI.
14 AAPL Form 710-2002 Model Form Offshore Operating Agreement (2002 AAPL 
Offshore JOA).
15 AAPL Form 810-2007 Model Form Deepwater Operating Agreement (2007 AAPL 
Deepwater JOA).
16 See Andrew B. Derman & Isabel Amadeo, “The 1989 AAPL Model Form Operating 
Agreement—Why Are You Not Using It?” Oil & Gas Agreements: Joint Operations 16-1, 
16-2 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 2008). See also A. Timothy Martin & J. Jay Park, “Global 
Petroleum Industry Model Contracts Revisited: Higher, Faster, Stronger,” 3 J. World Energy 
L. & Bus. 4, 8 (2010).
17 The frequency of litigation reflects that the model forms are drafted by committees, 
whose members often disagree and ultimately compromise and move on, leaving language 
that may be unclear; that parties sometimes substantially and inartfully modify the terms of 
the model agreements; that “models” do not necessarily fit the circumstances in which they 
are used; and that there is lots of money at stake.
18 A search of the Foundation’s Digital Library alone found more than 100 papers with 
“Operating” or “Operator” in the title.
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The AAPL has begun the process of revising the AAPL Form 610-1989 
Model Form Operating Agreement (AAPL Form 610-1989),19 and over 
the next couple of years everyone active in the industry likely will find 
themselves discussing what the drafting committee proposes or what the 
drafting committee ought to do. This chapter will consider some issues 
that commonly arise with operating agreements and suggest to the draft-
ing committee some changes that they might consider. In particular, this 
chapter will focus on what we can learn from others, looking at some of 
the provisions in the Association of International Petroleum Negotiators 
(AIPN) 2012 Model International JOA (AIPN 2012 JOA),20 the Canadian 
Association of Petroleum Landmen (CAPL) 2007 Operating Procedure 
(CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure),21 the Australian Mining and Petro-
leum Law Association (AMPLA) Model Petroleum Joint Operating Agree-
ment (AMPLA 2011 JOA),22 the United Kingdom Offshore Operators 
Association (UKOOA) Model Form JOA (UKOOA 2009 JOA), and the 
model forms issued by the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation.23 
19 The committee includes Fred MacDonald, Bob Duplantis, Jeff Weems, Mike Curry, 
Tom Daily, Dorsey Roach, Andy Rudderow, Worth Carlin, Dave Padgett, Jim Dewbre, and 
Dora Soria. See Worth Carlin & Jeff Weems, “Changes Within the AAPL 610 - 1989 Model 
Form Operating Agreement: Horizontal Modifications and Other Developments,” Develop-
ment Issues in Major Shale Plays: What’s on the Horizon? 5-1 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 2014).
20 AIPN endorsed model forms in 1990, 1995, 2002, and 2012.
21 In Canada, one typically sees one of the five model form operating procedures devel-
oped by the CAPL and issued in 1971, 1974, 1982, 1990, and 2007. See Douglas G. Mills, 
Carolyn A. Wright & Julie J.M. Inch, “Exploring the Balance of Power in the Operator/Non-
Operator Relationship Under the CAPL Operating Procedure,” 48 Alta. L. Rev. 363 (2010).
22 In Australia, one typically sees either one of the AIPN forms or the model form 
published by AMPLA in 2011. See AMPLA Model Petroleum Joint Operating Agreement, 
Approved Version 1 (Dec. 9, 2011) (AMPLA 2011 JOA). See also John Grace, “The AMPLA 
Model Petroleum Joint Operating Agreement,” AMPLA Yearbook 204 (2011) (discussion of 
AMPLA 2011 JOA by its drafter).
23 There are three model form operating agreements published by the Foundation. 
RMMLF Form 1, the first organizationally generated model form, was issued by the Foun-
dation in May 1954, predating Kraftbilt’s Form 610 by more than a year. RMMLF Form 
1 was designed for use with undivided interests, i.e., where the parties to the agreement 
jointly owned interests in the same leases. It is not often used today. See Hendrix, supra note 
12, at 6-4 to 6-5. In the Rocky Mountain area, where federal lands are involved, it is com-
mon to see the Foundation’s Rocky Mountain Unit Operating Agreement, Form 2 (Divided 
Interest) (RMMLF Form 2), which was published by the Foundation in 1980 and revised in 
1985 and 1994. RMMLF Form 2 is designed for use with divided interests, i.e., where the 
parties to the agreement own interests in different leases subjected to the unit:
Under the [RMMLF] Form 2 the working interest owners participate in costs 
and production on the basis of “participating areas” (smaller areas within the 
unit approximating the area capable of producing unitized substances in paying 
quantities), in proportion to the committed acreage each owns in the participat-
ing areas. While participation is based upon acreage within participating areas, 
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This chapter will also examine the more recent AAPL drafting ventures for 
offshore operations, which the AAPL drafting committee might consider 
to address the recurring issues that will be discussed.24 Due to time and 
space limitations, the focus will be on issues related to operators—particu-
larly operator liability and operator removal.
There is a sharp contrast between the theory and the practice of being an 
operator. In theory, the operator serves as an accommodation to the non-
operators, who are not the operator’s partners, but lease or mineral-estate 
cotenants or separate lease owners working together under a contractual 
cotenancy created by the operating agreement. The basic scheme of oper-
ating agreements around the world is that the operator will be one of the 
working interest owners. Generally, the operator is either a large work-
ing interest owner or one that has equipment and personnel conveniently 
located to the property that serves the group of owners in the interest of 
efficiency, rather than to make a profit from charging fees for acting as 
operator.25 The operator is not directly compensated for being the opera-
tor. The concept is that the operator will make its profits from its owner-
ship of mineral rights and the sale of its percentage of production, just like 
the non-operators, rather than from fees paid by its co-owners.
In practice, being an operator brings with it many advantages that may 
translate to profit. The operator can keep its equipment gainfully employed 
and its employees maintaining and upgrading their skills, while obtaining 
financial and perhaps technical support from non-operators. Overhead 
rates provided for in the Council of Petroleum Accountants Societies, Inc. 
(COPAS) accounting procedures are often generous.26 Most importantly, 
the participating areas can expand or contract and each participant’s share of 
costs and production in wells within a participating area can change based upon 
a number of factors, including the drilling of additional wells. This concept 
makes divided type units unique and some of the most complicated agreements 
in the oil and gas industry. The [RMMLF] Form 2 is the most widely used operat-
ing agreement for federal exploratory units.
Hendrix, supra note 12, at 6-5. The Foundation also publishes the Rocky Mountain Joint 
Operating Agreement, Form 3 (RMMLF Form 3), originally published in 1959 and again 
in 1968, which has largely been supplanted by versions of the AAPL model form. See id.
24 See 2007 AAPL Deepwater JOA; 2002 AAPL Offshore JOA.
25 Where the transaction is structured so that the operator makes a profit from being the 
operator, as are many investments sold from “boiler room” operations in the United States, 
investors and their lawyers may see these limitations as inappropriate. See John S. Lowe, Oil 
and Gas Law in a Nutshell 420 (6th ed. 2014).
26 See Robert C. Bledsoe, “Current Problems Between Operators and Nonoperators in 
Operating Agreements,” 40 Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax’n 8-1, 8-4 (Sw. Legal Fdn. 1989) 
(“The operator often has a substantial financial stake in remaining as operator, not to men-
tion his pride.”).
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being an operator brings with it the ability to shape the overall operational 
plan and to control outright day-to-day operations, both of which provide 
protections to the operator’s investment that the non-operators do not 
have.27 Often, the question of who gets to be the operator is one of the most 
hotly debated issues as parties negotiate operating agreements.28
But the freewheeling “wildcatting” culture of the North American oil 
and gas industry often leads an operator, once ensconced, to act as a virtual 
dictator, proposing and conducting operations with little or no consulta-
tion with non-operators.29 Disputes between operators and non-operators 
are frequent. Operator liability and operator removal are recurring topics 
explored in this chapter.
§ 27.02 Operator Liability—Should an Operator Be Liable for 
Breach of the JOA in the Absence of Gross Negligence 
or Willful Misconduct?
The model form operating agreements make it hard for non-operators 
to recover damages from the operator. Exculpatory language in the model 
forms severely limits the ability of non-operators to hold the operator 
liable. The operator acts for the non-operators subject to a “good and 
workmanlike” standard, but it is liable for its actions as operator only 
where it is guilty of “gross negligence or willful misconduct.” The appar-
ent contradiction in terms in fact makes perfect sense in the industry: the 
operator serves as an accommodation to the non-operators, rather than as 
a for-hire independent contractor or employee.30 Since the operator is not 
27 P. Sean Murphy & Jonathan Sutcliffe, “The Operator’s Limitation of Liability Under 
the 1995 AIPN Model Form International Operating Agreement—Have We Gone Too 
Far?” Landman 1, 9 (May/June 2002). Murphy and Sutcliffe were discussing one of the 
AIPN forms, but the principle applies to all operating agreements; “It’s good to be king,” as 
Mel Brooks said in the movie, History of the World, Part I.
28 The party to the agreement with the largest production interest is often the operator. 
It is usually considered imperative by the parties to an operating agreement that the opera-
tor have a substantial production interest in the contract area. See Michael D. Josephson, 
“How Far Does the CAPL Travel? A Comparative Overview of the CAPL Model Form 
Operating Procedure and the AIPN Model Form International Operating Agreement,” 41 
Alta. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2003). It is often said that investors want the operator to have “skin in the 
game.”
29 Non-operators have limited duties under the JOA, the most important duty being pro-
viding funds to the operator. See Nkaepe Etteh, “Joint Operating Agreements: Which Issues 
are Likely to Be the Most Sensitive to the Parties and How Can a Good Contract Design 
Limit the Damage from Such Disputes?” at 4 (Univ. of Dundee Ctr. for Energy, Petroleum 
& Mineral L. & Pol’y 2010) (unpublished).
30 The AIPN 2012 JOA states that explicitly: the operator shall “neither gain a profit 
nor suffer a loss as a result of being the Operator . . . .” AIPN 2012 JOA, at art. 4.2.B.5. The 
AMPLA 2011 JOA and CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure have similar language at clause 
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paid directly for its services, it should be liable for its mistakes and failures 
only where they are gross or willful.
But the scope of the exculpatory language is an issue: does the “gross neg-
ligence or willful misconduct” limitation on liability apply to all breaches 
of the JOA?
[1] Provisions of the AAPL Model Forms
The issue developed in the context of changes in the AAPL model form. 
Article 5 of the AAPL Form 610-1956 provided that the operator
shall conduct and direct and have full control of all operations on the Unit Area 
as permitted and required by, and within the limits of, this agreement. It shall 
conduct all such operations in a good and workmanlike manner, but it shall 
have no liability as Operator to the other parties for losses sustained, or liabilities 
incurred, except such as may result from gross negligence or from breach of the 
provisions of this agreement.31
The language quoted plainly tied the liability limitation to lease operations 
and plainly permitted non-operators to recover damages for breach of the 
terms of the operating agreement.32 But in the 1977 and 1982 AAPL model 
form revisions, the language of the second sentence was changed to
6.3(c) and clause 5.2, respectively. The drafting committee should consider adding such 
language to the new AAPL model form, or perhaps drafting alternative provisions: one 
adopting the “no profit” position, and another stating forthrightly that the operator expects 
to make a profit from fees for providing services.
31 AAPL Form 610-1956, at art. V (emphasis added). The exculpatory language of the 
other early model form, RMMLF Form 1, was not so plainly stated. It provided that the “Unit 
Operator shall not be liable to any other Party for anything done or omitted to be done by 
it in the conduct of operations hereunder except in case of bad faith,” thus interjecting the 
issue of the operator’s subjective state of mind. RMMLF Form 1, at art. 8.3. Similar language 
was in article 4.5 of RMMLF Form 3 and in the AIPN 1990 JOA, which defined “gross neg-
ligence” to exclude “any error of judgment or mistake made . . . in the exercise in good faith 
of any function, authority or discretion conferred . . . under this Agreement.” AIPN 1990 
JOA, at art. 1.36. Subsequent AIPN versions dropped the reference, but it is maintained in 
the definitions of the UKOOA 2009 JOA in the event of “special circumstances”:
“Wilful Misconduct” means an intentional or reckless disregard by Senior Mana-
gerial Personnel of Good Oilfield Practice or any of the terms of this Agreement 
in utter disregard of avoidable and harmful consequences but shall not include 
any act, omission, error of judgment or mistake made in the exercise in good faith 
of any function, authority or discretion vested in or exercisable by such Senior 
Managerial Personnel and which in the exercise of such good faith is justifiable by 
special circumstances, including safeguarding of life, property or the environment 
and other emergencies.
UKOOA 2009 JOA, at cl. 1.1 (emphasis added).
32 See, e.g., Lancaster v. Petroleum Corp. of Del., 491 So. 2d 768 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (an 
operator who resigned without giving the 90 days’ notice required by article 21 was held 
liable for loss of a non-operator’s interest).
27-10 Mineral Law Institute § 27.02[1]
[Operator] shall conduct all such operations in a good and workmanlike manner, 
but it shall have no liability as Operator to the other parties for losses sustained 
or liabilities incurred, except such as may result from gross negligence or willful 
misconduct.33
The drafters added “willful misconduct” and omitted “or from breach of 
the provisions of this agreement.”
Professor Ernest Smith argued that the intent of the language change was 
to expand the exculpatory language so that it applied to any cause of action 
that a non-operator might assert, whether for tortious conduct or a breach 
of contract.34 Though a federal court applying Texas law held in Stine v. 
Marathon Oil Co.35 that the changed exculpatory language was to be inter-
preted very broadly,36 several courts, relying in part upon the analysis of 
Professor Gary Conine,37 have held that the changes in fact limited the 
exculpatory language to non-operators’ claims relating to the conduct of 
operations; it is not necessary for a non-operator alleging that the operator 
has breached the operating agreement to show gross negligence or will-
ful misconduct.38 By this line of cases, referred to here as the “Abraxus 
line,” the exculpatory language applies only to the conduct of operations or 
breaches of express or implied obligations that relate to operations.
33 AAPL Form 610-1977, at art. V.A; AAPL Form 610-1982, at art. V.A.
34 Ernest E. Smith, “Duties and Obligations Owed by an Operator to Nonoperators, 
Investors, and Other Interest Owners,” 32 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 12-1, 12-30 (1986).
35 976 F.2d 254 (5th Cir. 1992).
36 The court in Stine reasoned that:
The tenor of the wording of the exculpatory clause is that Marathon [the 
operator] is not liable for good faith performance of “duties under this agree-
ment” . . . . Thus, in the present case, Marathon is not liable for any action taken 
in connection with the completion, testing or turnover, or any well drilled under 
the provisions of the JOA unless Stine [the non-operator] can prove that Mara-
thon’s actions were grossly negligent or willful. This protection extends to Mara-
thon’s various administrative and accounting duties, including the recovery of 
costs under the authority of the JOA.
It is clear to us that the protection of the exculpatory clause extends not only 
to “acts unique to the operator,” as the district court expressed it, but also to any 
acts done under the authority of the JOA “as Operator.” This protection clearly 
extends to breaches of the JOA.
Id. at 261 (citations omitted).
37 See Gary B. Conine, “The Prudent Operator Standard: Applications beyond the Oil 
and Gas Lease,” 41 Nat. Res. J. 23, 66–74 (2001).
38 See Abraxas Petroleum Corp. v. Hornburg, 20 S.W.3d 741 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, 
no pet.); Cone v. Fagadau Energy Corp., 68 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2001, pet. 
denied); IP Petroleum Co. v. Wevanco Energy, L.L.C., 116 S.W.3d 888 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied); Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P’ship v. Long Trusts, 134 S.W.3d 267 
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The AAPL Form 610-1989, which predated all of the cases that applied 
the “gross negligence or willful misconduct” limitation narrowly, appeared 
to move back toward the broad Stine interpretation, providing that:
Operator shall conduct its activities under this agreement as a reasonable prudent 
operator, in a good and workmanlike manner, with due diligence and dispatch, 
in accordance with good oilfield practice, and in compliance with applicable law 
and regulations, but in no event shall it have any liability as Operator to the other 
parties for losses sustained or liabilities incurred except such as may result from 
gross negligence or willful misconduct.39
That language was interpreted expansively by the Texas Supreme Court 
in Reeder v. Wood County Energy, LLC.40 There, non-operators claimed 
damages because their operator had failed to maintain production in pay-
ing quantities, causing valuable leases to terminate and the Texas Railroad 
Commission to dissolve the unit and suspend operations. At trial, a jury 
found the operator had breached his duty to the non-operators by failing to 
maintain production in paying quantities and that the exculpatory clause 
did not exempt the operator from liability because his conduct rose “to the 
level of gross negligence or willful misconduct.”41 The court of appeals held 
that the exculpatory clause could not have protected the operator from the 
claims of the non-operators because it did not apply to breach-of-contract 
claims.42
On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court focused on the change of the lan-
guage of the model forms.43 The supreme court noted that while the 1956, 
1977, and 1982 model forms had linked the exculpatory language to the 
operator’s obligation to “conduct all such operations in a good and work-
manlike manner,”44 the 1989 form tied it to the operator’s duty to “conduct 
its activities under this agreement as a reasonable prudent operator, in a 
good and workmanlike manner, with due diligence and in accordance with 
(Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, pet. denied); Shell Rocky Mountain Prod., LLC v. Ultra Res., Inc., 
415 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2005). See also PYR Energy Corp. v. Samson Res. Co., 470 F. Supp. 
2d 709 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (discussion of whether in a diversity case a federal district court 
applying Texas law should follow Stine or the Abraxas line of cases in ruling on the scope of 
the JOA’s exculpatory clause).
39 AAPL Form 610-1989, at art. V.A (emphasis added).
40 395 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2012).
41 Id. at 790.
42 Id. at 790–91.
43 Id. at 794.
44 Id. at 793 (emphasis added) (quoting Reeder v. Wood Cnty. Energy, LLC, 320 S.W.3d 
433, 444 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2010)).
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good oilfield practice . . . .”45 Based upon the language differences—“its 
activities under this agreement” rather than “all such operations”—and 
noting that some commentators had concluded the AAPL Form 610-1989 
provided for a broader exculpation of the operator, the Texas Supreme 
Court held that the 1989 model form exculpatory language protected the 
operator against liability for mere negligence not just in the conduct of 
basic oilfield operations but arising out of its conduct of all activities under 
the operating agreement.46
Where “gross negligence or willful misconduct” is the standard for an 
operator’s liability, the bar for non-operators is high. “Gross negligence is 
generally defined as the failure to use even slight care.”47 To prove gross 
negligence, a non-operator must show much more than mere negligence. 
The key aspect of gross negligence is the “conscious indifference” to a 
known risk.48 There must be evidence that the operator had actual subjec-
tive knowledge of an extreme risk of serious harm and nonetheless pro-
ceeded to act.49 Also, there must be some extraordinary harm foreseeable, 
not the type of harm ordinarily associated with breaches of contract or 
even with bad-faith denials of contract rights; harm such as “death, griev-
ous physical injury, or financial ruin” is necessary.50 Willful misconduct 
is a similarly high standard; Texas courts have held that there is little 
45 Id. (emphasis added).
46 Id. at 794–95 (citing Robert C. Bledsoe, “The Operating Agreement: Matters Not 
Covered or Inadequately Covered,” 47 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 15-1, 15-9 (2001); Wilson 
Woods, Comment, “The Effect of Exculpatory Clauses in Joint Operating Agreements: 
What Protections Do Operators Really Have in the Oil Patch?” 38 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 211, 
214–15 (2005)). After finding that the operator had not acted with gross negligence or 
willful misconduct, the Texas Supreme Court reversed and ruled in favor of the operator. 
Id. at 797.
47 Andrew B. Derman, The New and Improved 1989 Joint Operating Agreement: A Work-
ing Manual 27 (1991).
48 Robert L. Theriot, “Disputes Between Operators and Non-Operators: Judicial Appli-
cation of Joint Operating Agreements,” 30 Oil, Gas & Energy Res. L. Sec. Rep., No. 3, at 95 
(State Bar of Tex. 2006) (citing Flye v. City of Waco, 50 S.W.3d 645 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, 
no pet.)).
49 Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 22 (Tex. 1994), superseded by statute, 2003 
Tex. Sess. L. Serv. ch. 204, § 13 (raised the standard to require clear and convincing evi-
dence), as recognized in U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 140 (Tex. 2012).
50 879 S.W.2d at 24.
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distinction between it and gross negligence.51 If there is a distinction, it is 
that willful misconduct may require a higher element of intent.52
In sum, an operator is grossly negligent if it either knowingly does 
something contrary to good oilfield practice, realizing that its action could 
result in extraordinary harm or financial ruin to the non-operators, or 
refuses to act when it is so required by the JOA or other contracts and the 
failure results in financial ruin to the non-operators’ property.53 An opera-
tor engages in willful misconduct if it acts or refuses to act with a specific 
intent to harm the non-operators.
Whether the operator’s actions or inactions constitute gross negligence 
is a question of fact. The court in IP Petroleum Co. v. Wevanco Energy, 
L.L.C.54 required a finding of great misconduct, rather than a series of 
errors. There, the operator had no written drilling plan for the well; failed 
to use drilling mud so that the drill bit became stuck, adding more than 
$100,000 to drilling costs; ran no drill-stem test on the well; did not inform 
the non-operators that setting pipe would prevent well deepening; and 
permitted the farmout agreement under which it was operating to expire 
while it was still engaged in drilling operations.55 The court said that these 
failures were “legally sufficient evidence of negligence,” but did not “rise to 
the level of gross negligence . . . .”56
Many think that the Reeder case goes too far, and that the drafting com-
mittee may move back to the language of the 1977 and 1982 agreements or 
state plainly in the new AAPL form that the exculpatory language does not 
apply to breaches of contract.57 But the divergence of the  commentators 
51 See IP Petroleum Co. v. Wevanco Energy, L.L.C., 116 S.W.3d 888, 898 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (citing Marshall Indep. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 
790 F. Supp. 1291 (E.D. Tex. 1992)).
52 See Jeanine Feriancek, “Operator Liability for Negligence?” 11 Nat. Resources & Env’t 
58, 60 (1996).
53 Id.
54 116 S.W.3d 888 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
55 Id. at 897–98.
56 Id. at 898. But see Hamilton v. Tex. Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W.2d 316, 323 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 1982) (holding that an operator might be held liable under the operating agree-
ment for drilling a well at other than the agreed location without even giving notice to the 
non-operator and stating that “[s]everal connected acts of simple negligence may support a 
jury’s finding of gross negligence”).
57 See Carlin & Weems, supra note 19, at 5-50 (discussing recent JOA modifications 
affecting horizontal drilling in shale plays, the speakers stated that the provision was cur-
rently being rewritten to distinguish “the standards of conduct from the limitations of 
liability”).
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and the cases raises the question of how broad the operator’s liability limi-
tation should be.
[2] Provisions of Other Model Forms
Other model forms give little guidance regarding any industry “norm”: 
the scope of the liability exclusion apparently varies.
The AIPN 2012 JOA likely gives an operator protection broader than any 
of the AAPL model forms. It begins with a release of liability for “perform-
ing (or failing to perform) the duties and functions of Operator,” including 
liability for gross negligence or willful misconduct:
neither Operator nor any other Operator Indemnitee shall bear (except as a Party 
to the extent of its Participating Interest share) any damage, loss, cost, or liability 
resulting from performing (or failing to perform) the duties and functions of 
Operator, and the Operator Indemnitees[58] are hereby released from liability 
to Non-Operators for any and all damages, losses, costs, and liabilities arising 
out of, incident to or resulting from such performance or failure to perform, 
even though caused in whole or in part by a pre-existing defect, or the negligence 
(whether sole, joint or concurrent), gross negligence, willful misconduct, strict 
liability or other legal fault of Operator (or any other Operator Indemnitee).59
The AIPN 2012 JOA follows with an indemnification promise from the 
non-operators that also extends to gross negligence and willful misconduct:
the Parties shall (in proportion to their Participating Interests) defend and indem-
nify Operator Indemnitees from any damages, losses, costs (including reason-
able legal costs, expenses and attorneys’ fees), and liabilities incident to claims, 
demands or causes of action brought by or for any person or entity, which claims, 
demands or causes of action arise out of, are incident to or result from Joint 
Operations, even though caused in whole or in part by a pre-existing defect, or 
the negligence (whether sole, joint or concurrent), gross negligence, willful mis-
conduct, strict liability or other legal fault of Operator (or any other Operator 
Indemnitee).60
The AIPN 2012 JOA contains an option, however, which the parties usu-
ally choose, that extends the possibility of liability for gross negligence or 
willful misconduct. But in comparison to the language of the AAPL model 
forms, it only narrowly opens the window to operator liability:
58 “Operator Indemnitee” is defined as “any of the Operator, its Affiliates, or their 
respective directors, officers, and employees. Operator Indemnitees means all of them.” 
AIPN 2012 JOA, at art. 1.1.
59 Id. at art. 4.6.A (emphasis added).
60 Id. at art. 4.6.B (emphasis added).
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Despite Article 4.6.A or 4.6.B, if any Senior Supervisory Personnel[61] of Opera-
tor or its Affiliates engage in Gross Negligence/Willful Misconduct[62] that 
proximately causes the Parties to incur damage, loss, cost, or liability for claims, 
demands or causes of action referred to in Article 4.6.A or 4.6.B, then, in addi-
tion to its Participating Interest share:
Alternative Provision, Choose one
Alternative #1 - No Limitation
Operator shall bear all such damages, losses, costs, and liabilities.
Alternative #2 - Joint Property Limitation
Operator shall bear only the actual damage, loss, cost, and liability to repair, 
replace and/or remove Joint Property[63] so damaged or lost, if any.
Alternative #3 - Financial Limitation
Operator shall bear only the first [__________ U.S. dollars] of such damages, 
losses, costs, and liabilities.64
While the AIPN 2012 JOA definition of gross negligence/willful miscon-
duct is probably much the same as the common law meaning, the optional 
provision offers non-operators less recourse than any of the AAPL model 
forms. The AIPN clause requires that the liability-triggering action or 
omission be that of a supervisor, usually a relatively high-level supervisor. 
Further, the actual liability of the operator may be limited by the nature of 
61 “Senior Supervisory Personnel means, with respect to a Party, any director or officer 
of such Party, and any individual who functions for such Party or one of its Affiliates at a 
management level equivalent or superior to any individual functioning as such Party’s . . . .” 
Id. at art. 1.1. The parties entering into the agreement can choose from one of the five tiers 
of supervisory duties, ranging from field supervisors to county managers. See id. Gener-
ally, the parties choose Alternative No. 4 (senior managers reporting directly to the county 
manager) or Alternative No. 5 (county manager).
62 “Gross Negligence/Willful Misconduct” is defined as
any act or failure to act (whether sole, joint or concurrent) by any person or 
entity that was intended to cause, or was in reckless disregard of or wanton indif-
ference to, harmful consequences such person or entity knew, or should have 
known, such act or failure would have on the safety or property of another per-
son or entity.
Id.
63 “Joint Property means, at any point in time, all wells, facilities, equipment, materials, 
information, funds, and property (other than Hydrocarbons) held for use in Joint Opera-
tions.” Id. It does not include either damage to the formation or environmental damage.
64 AIPN 2012 JOA, at art. 4.6.D.
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the damage, the amount, or both. Some have criticized the AIPN forms for 
the breadth of the exculpatory language.65
The structure of the CAPL, AMPLA, and UKOOA model forms is 
similar to that of the AAPL forms; an operator that is grossly negligent or 
engages in willful misconduct is subject to full liability for damages. But 
the scope of the exculpatory language in the three forms is different. Clause 
3.04 of the CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure provides that:
The Operator will manage all Joint Property and conduct all Joint Operations 
diligently, in a good and workmanlike manner, in compliance with the Title 
Documents and the Regulations and in accordance with good oilfield practice, 
including prudent reservoir management and conservation principles. Insofar as 
the Operator hires contractors hereunder, it will supervise them as is reasonable. 
Notwithstanding the preceding portion of this Clause, a breach of the obligations 
contained in this Clause will not result in any form of liability (whether in tort, 
contract or otherwise) of the Operator to the Parties, except insofar as the conduct 
65 Murphy & Sutcliffe, supra note 27, at 9; Philip Weems & Michael Bolton, King & Spald-
ing LLP, “Highlights of Key Revisions—2002 AIPN Model Form International Operating 
Agreement,” at 4 (2002). Interestingly, the final draft of the AIPN 2012 JOA included 
another optional provision that would have made the operator liable for administrative 
failures:
Optional Provision, Choose, if desired. If not chosen check 
cross-references.
4.6.E  Despite Article 4.6.D, Operator (i) shall not be released from or indemni-
fied for, and (ii) shall bear all, damages, losses, costs, and/or liabilities 
arising out of, incident to, or resulting from:
4.6.E.1  Operator’s indemnity obligation under Article 20.1;
4.6.E.2  A final adjudication, or an admission or settlement of allegations, that 
Operator, its Affiliates, or any of their personnel misappropriated or 
embezzled funds paid to or held by the Operator under this Agreement;
4.6.E.3  A final adjudication, or an admission or settlement of allegations, that 
Operator, its Affiliates, or any of their personnel engaged in Gross Neg-
ligence / Willful Misconduct that proximately caused Operator not to 
properly perform one or more of the following administrative, account-
ing, financial, or procedural duties or functions:
   (a)  adherence to approved Work Programs and Budgets and AFE’s 
under Article 4.2.B.1;
   (b)  receipt, payment, and accounting of funds under Article 4.2.B.3 and 
the Accounting Procedure;
   (c)  supplying data and filing reports under Article 4.4.A;
   (d)  procurement and maintenance of insurance under Article 4.7;
   (e)  compliance with contract award requirements under Articles 
4.2.B.16 and 6.6; and/or
   (f)  compliance with over-expenditure limitations and approvals under 
Article 6.8.
It was not included in the final version of the AIPN 2012 JOA.
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to which the breach pertains constitutes Gross Negligence or Wilful Misconduct[66] 
for which the Operator is solely responsible under Article 4.00.67
This language would appear to provide protection for an operator similar 
to the Abraxus line of cases. The exculpatory language extends only to the 
“breach of the obligations contained in this Clause,” and the clause imposes 
obligations relating to “management of Joint Property” and the “conduct 
of Joint Operations.”68 Thus, non-operators could recover damages for 
breaches of the contract other than a breach of “good oilfield practice,”69 
a breach of the health, safety, and environmental risks provision,70 and a 
breach of the title maintenance provisions.71
The AMPLA 2011 JOA, on the other hand, appears to extend the excul-
patory language to all of the operator’s activities, as does Reeder. The 
AMPLA 2011 JOA does not use the term “gross negligence,” but defines 
“Wilful Misconduct” to mean “any act or failure to act which was intended 
to cause, or was in reckless disregard or wanton indifference to, the fore-
seeable consequences of such action or failure to act.”72 Clause 6.5 then 
continues:
Except as a Participant to the extent of its Percentage Share, the Operator is not 
liable to the Participants for any loss sustained or liability incurred in connection 
with the Joint Venture, even if arising from the negligence of the Operator or 
any person for whom the Operator may be vicariously liable, except where, in 
66 The CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure defines “Gross Negligence or Wilful Miscon-
duct” as:
any act, omission or failure to act (whether sole, joint or concurrent) by a person 
that was intended to cause, or was in reckless disregard of, or wanton indifference 
to, the harmful consequences to the safety or property of another person or to 
the environment which the person acting or failing to act knew (or should have 
known) would result from such act, omission or failure to act. However, Gross 
Negligence or Wilful Misconduct does not include any act, omission or failure 
to act insofar as it: (i) constituted mere ordinary negligence; or (ii) was done or 
omitted in accordance with the express instructions or approval of all Parties, 
insofar as the act, omission or failure to act otherwise constituting Gross Negli-
gence or Wilful Misconduct was inherent in those instructions or that approval.
CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure, at cl. 1.2.
67 Id. at cl. 3.04 (emphasis added).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at cl. 3.05A.
71 Id. at cl. 3.10A. This is the conclusion of Mills, Wright & Inch, supra note 21, at 375.
72 AMPLA 2011 JOA, at cl. 1.1.
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a particular case, the Operator (or that person) has committed fraud or Wilful 
Misconduct.73
The reference to “in connection with the Joint Venture” is broader than 
“breach of the obligations contained in this Clause.”
Similarly, the UKOOA 2009 JOA uses language that probably would be 
interpreted consistently with the Reeder interpretation:
The Operator shall not be liable for and each Participant (including for the avoid-
ance of doubt the Participant designated as Operator) shall defend, indemnify 
and hold the Operator harmless:
(a) to the extent of the indemnifying Participant’s Percentage Interest from 
and against any loss, damage or claim by or liability to any person, whether 
a Participant or not, (including any award of damages and any legal or 
other costs and expenses incurred in respect of such claim or liability) 
which arises, whether directly or indirectly, out of the performance, non-
performance or misperformance by the Operator of any of its duties or obli-
gations as Operator hereunder . . . , irrespective of negligence and/or breach 
of duty (whether statutory or otherwise) on the part of the Operator, except 
only for any loss, damage, claim or liability resulting from or arising out of:
(i) the Wilful Misconduct of the Operator; or
(ii) the failure of the Operator to obtain or maintain any insurance which 
it is required to obtain and maintain . . . , except where the Operator 
has used all reasonable endeavours to obtain or maintain any such 
insurance but has been unable to do so and has promptly notified the 
Participants participating or proposing to participate therein . . . .74
The exculpatory language extends to losses that arise “whether directly 
or indirectly, out of the performance, non-performance or misperfor-
mance by the Operator of any of its duties or obligations as Operator 
here under . . . .”75
The AAPL offshore model forms show a similar split. The AAPL Form 
710-2002 Model Form Offshore Operating Agreement (2002 AAPL Off-
shore JOA) limits the liability for gross negligence or willful misconduct 
to “operations.”76 But the AAPL Form 810-2007 Model Form Deepwater 
Operating Agreement (2007 AAPL Deepwater JOA) requires gross neg-
ligence or willful misconduct to impose liability for either “activities or 
operations” under the JOA or affecting the lease, which would appear to 
apply to breaches of contract.77
73 Id. at cl. 6.5 (emphasis added).
74 UKOOA 2009 JOA, at cl. 6.2.4.
75 Id. at cl. 6.2.4(a).
76 2002 AAPL Offshore JOA, at art. 5.2. The form uses the phrase “activities and opera-
tions” in several other articles.
77 2007 AAPL Deepwater JOA, at art. 5.2.
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On balance, the Abraxus line of cases, limiting the scope of the “gross 
negligence or willful misconduct” exclusion to the conduct of operations 
or breaches of express or implied obligations that relate to operations, is a 
more workable result, though Professor Smith’s analysis of the purpose of 
the language changes is compelling.78 As stated by the Tenth Circuit in 
Shell Rocky Mountain Production, LLC v. Ultra Resources, Inc.,79 requir-
ing a showing of gross negligence or willful misconduct to impose liability 
on an operator makes sense for physical operations because the interests 
of the operator and the non-operators are aligned, but “it is nonsensical 
to apply such a standard to administrative and accounting duties where 
the operator can profit by cheating, or simply overcharging, its working 
interest owners.”80 Oil and gas operations are indeed risky, but we should 
expect that all the parties, including operators, will perform the promises 
of their contracts.
Perhaps the best approach for the drafting committee is to let the parties 
make the choice. A new model form should give the parties the options 
to decide to make the operator liable only for gross negligence or willful 
misconduct for both the conduct of operations and for breaches of con-
tract, give the operator the protection of the exculpatory language only for 
operations, or subject the operator to full liability for both negligence and 
breach of contract.
[3] Suggestions for the Drafters
[a] Provide Cost Overrun Options
However broadly their exculpatory provisions are interpreted, several 
of the model forms contain provisions that potentially take the edge off 
the limitation of the operator’s liability and that the drafting committee 
should consider offering as options in the context of cost overruns, which 
78 Not everyone will agree.
While the courts’ construction of the JOA in Abraxas and Fagadau is reason-
able, it arguably imposes an unfair burden of liability on the operator for contract 
performance. Unlike many contracts where profit is the main goal of perfor-
mance, the operator’s performance under the JOA does not entail the normal 
expectation of operation for profit.
Arthur J. Wright, “Joint Operating Agreements—Common Amendments and Mistakes,” 50 
Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 7-1, 7-9 (2004).
79 415 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2005).
80 Id. at 1171.
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are probably the most common source of disputes between operators and 
non-operators.81 The AIPN 2012 JOA provides that:
6.9.A  For commitments and expenditures with respect to any line item of 
an approved Work Program and Budget, Operator shall be entitled 
to incur in connection with the corresponding Joint Operation with-
out further approval of the Operating Committee a combined over-
commitment and over-expenditure for such line item up to ten percent 
(10%) of the authorized amount for such line item; provided that the 
cumulative total of all over-commitments and over-expenditures for a 
Calendar Year shall not exceed five percent (5%) of the total annual 
Work Program and Budget in question.
6.9.B   At such time Operator reasonably anticipates that the total amount of 
the commitments and expenditures actually incurred plus the com-
mitments to be incurred with respect to such line item exceeds the 
limits of Article 6.9.A, Operator shall furnish to the Operating Commit-
tee Operator’s reasonably detailed estimate of the total commitments 
and expenditures required to carry out the Joint Operation corre-
sponding to such line item, together with supporting information.82
In other words, if the operator’s cost overruns exceed 10% of any line item or 
5% of the annual work program and budget, it must provide the operating 
committee an authority for expenditure (AFE). The AIPN 2012 JOA allows 
alternatives as to whether the AFE is informational only, or is a supplemen-
tal expenditure that the operating committee must approve and reflect in 
a revised work program and budget.83 If the supplemental-expenditure 
alternative is chosen, it is clear “that the overexpenditures approved by the 
Operating Committee are to be included in the relevant Work Program 
& Budget used to determine Operator’s authority to subsequently incur 
overexpenditures without Operating Committee approval.”84
81 Operations under a JOA are typically based upon an authority for expenditure (AFE), 
which is usually prepared and circulated by the operator. There is no standard form for an 
AFE, and often non-operators are unhappy with the amount of detail the operator provides. 
Regardless of the amount of detail an operator gives, however, the case law is clear that an 
AFE is nothing but a device to implement the JOA by facilitating decision making, and that 
its estimates of the cost of proposed operations are just that—estimates. A non-operator 
that agrees to participate in an operation under a JOA is responsible for its share of cost 
overruns, and can successfully challenge them only if the operator has incurred them in 
bad faith, or they are excessive, unreasonable, or unauthorized by the AFE or JOA. See, e.g., 
M & T, Inc. v. Fuel Res. Dev. Co., 518 F. Supp. 285 (D. Colo. 1981) (actual costs of drilling a 
well were nearly twice what the AFE showed). There have been much worse cost overruns. 
See Parejo Ltd. 1981 v. Getty Oil Co., Nos. CV F-85-150, CV F-85-217, 1991 WL 260436 
(E.D. Cal. May 28, 1991) (an AFE of $4.4 million was followed by a well that cost at least 
$18 million).
82 AIPN 2012 JOA, at art. 6.9 (emphasis added).
83 Id.
84 Weems & Bolton, supra note 65, at 11.
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But what if the operating committee does not approve the operator’s sup-
plementary AFE? The AIPN provision on cost overruns neither expressly 
caps the liability of the non-operators nor imposes liability for excessive 
overruns on the operator, but merely opens the door for the participation 
of the operating committee.85
The Canadian and Australian JOA model counterparts contain similar 
provisions. The CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure provides:
AFE Overexpenditures-A Party’s approval of an AFE constitutes its approval of all 
expenditures necessary to conduct the Operation described therein, subject to 
the limitations or charges prescribed by the Accounting Procedure and Articles 
8.00 and 9.00 for Horizontal Wells and a Casing Point election respectively. 
However, the Operator will, for informational purposes only, promptly notify the 
Non-Operators if it incurs or expects to incur expenditures for a Joint Operation 
that exceeds the total amount estimated in the applicable AFE by more than the 
greater of $50,000 or 10%. It will include in that notice its explanation for that 
overexpenditure and its revised cost estimate for that Joint Operation. If that Joint 
Operation relates to a well, the Operator will then provide estimates of current 
and cumulative costs incurred therefor on a daily basis where practicable and 
weekly estimates of forecast costs until that Joint Operation is completed.86
The AMPLA 2011 JOA merely states that “if the Operator expects there 
will be a cost overrun in carrying out an Approved Programme which can-
not be avoided by Good Australian Oilfield Practice, the Operator may 
exceed a current Approved Budget by not more than 10%,” and requires 
that the operator report any unbudgeted expenditure to the participants.87 
It also authorizes the operating committee to decide whether to approve 
cost overruns, but does not expressly address the liability of the operator if 
the operating committee does not approve.88
85 The final draft of the AIPN 2012 JOA included an optional provision at article 
4.6.E.3(f) that would have made an operator liable where “Gross Negligence/Willful Mis-
conduct” caused the failure to comply “with over-expenditure limitations and approvals 
under Article 6.8.” See supra note 65. It was not included in the final version.
86 CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure, at cl. 3.2C (emphasis added).
87 AMPLA 2011 JOA, at cl. 8.4(a)(ii).
88 Id. at cl. 5.2(c). John Grace, the principal drafter of the AMPLA 2011 JOA, commented 
as follows:
On the question of non-approval in Australia of more than 10% cost overrun, 
if the Operator has committed to the expenditure without authority/approval 
(whether actual or ostensible, or by AFE whether prospective or retrospective) 
it must carry the cost itself. It is a useful restraining mechanism. This is not 
expressly stated but is the logical legal conclusion.
However there is also an unwritten rule in Australia that, once you appoint the 
Operator you support it through thick and thin—hell or high water—in all rea-
sonable circumstances including those that may not necessarily be Good Operat-
ing Practice, so long as it was not Wilful Misconduct. So it would be rare for an 
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Logical though it may be that an operator that incurs costs in excess of the 
contract limits without prior or subsequent approval of the non-operators 
should have to bear those costs, an express statement in the contract of the 
effect of excessive cost overruns is preferable. Professors Smith and Weaver 
have suggested that a JOA might include a clause putting the “entire risk” 
of excessive cost overruns on the operator or, alternatively, requiring that 
the operator circulate a new AFE that the non-operators can approve or 
disapprove.89 Either structure poses a dilemma for an operator. “Given the 
nature of the oil and gas industry, an operator may not reasonably know 
that the overexpenditure limits have been exceeded until the operation is 
completed and the overexpenditure has been incurred.”90
But several of the model forms contain provisions similar to those sug-
gested by Professors Smith and Weaver.91 Both the 2002 AAPL Offshore 
JOA and the 2007 AAPL Deepwater JOA contain provisions requiring a 
supplemental AFE and election to participate in the event that the operator 
exceeds overexpenditure limits, though using somewhat different terms. 
Article 8.7 of the 2002 AAPL Offshore JOA, an optional provision, states:
If Operator determines that the Overexpenditure will exceed the Allow-
able Variance,[92] Operator shall submit a new AFE for the current operation 
(“Supplemental AFE”) for approval of the Participating Parties. The Participating 
Operating Committee not to approve a greater than 10% cost overrun, provided 
it was reasonable within fairly flexible parameters. There would of course be 
much huffing and puffing before this position was reached.
Email from John Grace to John Lowe (May 27, 2014).
89 See Ernest E. Smith & Jacqueline Lang Weaver, 3 Tex. L. of Oil & Gas § 17.3[C][1] (2d 
ed. 2006).
90 Josephson, supra note 11, at 17-18. Further, drafting a functional excessive-cost clause 
may be hard to do. In Pegasus Energy Group, Inc. v. Cheyenne Petroleum Co., 3 S.W.3d 112 
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christie 1999, pet. denied), the court held that an exploration agree-
ment that required the non-operators to approve “any expenditures which exceed the AFEs 
attached hereto by ten percent (10.00%) or more,” required the operator to obtain approval 
for drilling costs that exceeded its AFEs by 10% on a well-by-well basis, rather than on a 
line-by-line or item-by-item basis. Id. at 122.
91 Some drafts of the AAPL Form 610-1989 had such a provision that was not adopted 
in the final version. See Derman, supra note 47, at 183–84.
92 The “Allowable Variance” is defined as an
Overexpenditure . . . no more than the greater of __________ Dollars ($_____) 
or __________ percent (___%), or in the case of an operation involving the 
design, construction, and installation of a Platform, or Development Facilities, 
no more than the greater of __________ Dollars ($_____) or __________ per-
cent (___%) . . . .
2002 AAPL Offshore JOA, at art. 8.7.
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Parties may then elect whether to continue to participate within __________ 
(___) days or __________ (___) hours if a rig is on location, [ ] inclusive [ ] 
exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and federal holidays, after receipt of the Supple-
mental AFE. If fewer than all, but one (1) or more Participating Parties elect 
to continue to participate in the current operation and agree to pay and bear 
one hundred percent (100%) of the costs and risks of conducting it, Operator 
shall continue to conduct the current operation. Otherwise, the operation shall 
cease.93
The 2007 AAPL Deepwater JOA provides that:
Except as provided in Article 6.2.3 (Further Operations During a Force Majeure), 
if it appears (based upon the Operator’s reasonable estimate) that the actual 
Costs associated with an original AFE or its approved supplemental AFEs will 
exceed the relevant permitted over-expenditure set forth below,[94] the Operator 
shall promptly submit a supplemental AFE to the Participating Parties. A supple-
mental AFE shall include the dollar amount of the permitted over-expenditure 
from the previously approved AFE as part of the dollar amount of that supple-
mental AFE. Subject to Article 8.6.1 (Well Proposals, Recompletions, and Work-
overs), after receipt of the supplemental AFE each Participating Party has the 
right to make an Election as to its further participation in the approved activity 
or operation.95
The UKOOA 2009 JOA does not permit a non-operator to elect not to 
participate further, but affirmatively requires the overspending operator 
to seek “prior approval” of the operating committee to incur additional 
expenses, which makes it easier to conclude that an operator that does not 
do so is financially responsible:
The Operator shall use reasonable endeavours not to exceed the approved explo-
ration and/or appraisal Budget but shall be entitled without prior approval of the 
Joint Operating Committee to incur expenditure:
(a) in excess of an approved AFE up to the lesser of ten per cent (10%) of the 
amount of the approved AFE and [  ]Pounds (£[  ]); and
(b) subject to (a) above, in excess of an approved exploration and/or appraisal 
Budget up to [  ] per cent ([  ]%) of the amount of the approved 
Budget.
Whenever it appears to the Operator that the over-expenditure for any item will 
exceed the amount authorised under this clause 10.5, the Operator shall revise 
the appropriate AFE and/or Budget and will seek the prior approval of the Joint 
Operating Committee to incur the additional expenditure prior to entering into 
any further commitment.96
93 Id.
94 The “permitted over-expenditure” is the lesser of a percentage of the AFE amount or 
a dollar amount, both of which are negotiated and may be different for different kinds of 
operations. See 2007 AAPL Deepwater JOA, at arts. 6.2.2.1–.4.
95 Id. at art. 6.2.2.
96 UKOOA 2009 JOA, at cl. 10.5.
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But the clearest statement found was that of the final draft of the AIPN 
2012 JOA, which included an optional provision that was dropped from 
the final version of the form:
4.6.E   Despite Article 4.6.D, Operator (i) shall not be released from or 
indemnified for, and (ii) shall bear all, damages, losses, costs, and/or 
liabilities arising out of, incident to, or resulting from:
. . . .
   (f) compliance with over-expenditure limitations and approvals under 
Article 6.8.97
For better or worse, limitation of the operator’s liability by reference to 
gross negligence or willful misconduct or both is a part of operating agree-
ments around the world. Some protection for the operator is generally jus-
tifiable, given the risks of the oil business. But the most common source of 
dispute—cost overruns—should be expressly addressed in a revised AAPL 
form using the approaches illustrated by the contract language quoted 
above as options.
[b] Provide an Option for an Operating 
Committee
Perhaps my most controversial suggestion will be that the drafting com-
mittee should also include in the new model form an option for an operat-
ing committee. Andrew Derman and James Barnes argued at the Rocky 
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation Annual Institute in 1996 that offshore 
and international operations were better conducted using an operating 
committee than the traditional U.S./Canadian onshore structure:
Historically, the first model form operating agreements were drafted to address 
the drilling of onshore wells primarily in the United States, where individual 
autonomy is a prized tradition. These agreements were conceived to deal with 
relatively unsophisticated technology, low cost wells, high margin prices, and 
small lease areas held under a property ownership system that fosters unilateral 
initiative. Under the circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the parties to 
delegate broad authority to one of them to organize the drilling of an exploratory 
well and to develop the field.98
They urged that in offshore and international operations, an operating 
committee was a more efficient structure because of the large contract 
97 See supra note 65.
98 Andrew B. Derman & James Barnes, “Autonomy Versus Alliance: An Examination 
of the Management and Control Provisions of Joint Operating Agreements,” 42 Rocky Mt. 
Min. L. Inst. 4-1, 4-12 (1996). See also id. at 4-6 (“The rationale generally given for this 
structure of autonomy and non-association is to avoid adverse U.S. tax effects and to limit 
liability among the co-adventurers. . . . A corollary consequence is the creation of a struc-
ture that reserves maximum autonomy to each individual co-adventurer and contemplates 
minimum cooperative action among the co-adventurers.”).
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areas, sophisticated technology, and expensive drilling and development 
involved; non-operators simply cannot afford to be “passive investors” in 
offshore and international operations.99
Derman and Barnes could have been writing about shale development 
and other operations involving horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, 
which are fast becoming the normal drilling and completing techniques. 
Horizontal drilling now accounts for more than 60% of all rig activity in 
the United States.100 And 90% of oil and gas wells in the United States 
undergo hydraulic fracturing to stimulate production.101 With advanced 
technology come higher costs. “Horizontal well costs are generally 20% 
to 25% higher than vertical well costs . . . .”102 More expensive rigs needed 
for horizontal drilling coupled with more fracking has raised costs “from 
$2 million to $5–6 million per well in the Woodford Shale of Southeast 
Oklahoma.”103 “A typical Bakken well costs $8–10 million with about 
$1.5–2.5 million in fracking cost.”104 And a single Marcellus well may have 
direct costs of more than $7.6 million.105 In the context of complicated and 
expensive technologies, it is in the interests of both operators and non-
operators that the JOA include an option for a process that brings all the 
parties—non-operators and the operator—together periodically to discuss 
and analyze projects and the technologies to perform them.
The AIPN, AMPLA, and UKOOA model forms all provide for operating 
committees.106 Neither the CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure nor the AAPL 
forms do, but RMMLF Form 1 and RMMLF Form 2 state that operations 
“shall be subject to supervision and control by the Parties,”107 and require 
99 Id.
100 See Independent Petroleum Ass’n of Am. (IPAA), “U.S. Oil Technology Revolu-
tionizing Development,” http://oilindependents.org/u-s-oil-technology-revolutionizing- 
development/.
101 See IPAA, “Hydraulic Fracturing: Effects on Energy Supply, the Economy, and the 
Environment” (Apr. 2008).
102 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, “Directional Drilling Technology,” at 6 (Dec. 10, 2012).
103 Timothy Fitzgerald, “Frackonomics: Some Economics of Hydraulic Fracturing,” 63 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1337, 1353 (2013).
104 Id. at 1352.
105 William E. Hefley et al., “The Economic Impact of the Value Chain of a Marcellus 
Shale Well,” at 65 tbl.12 (Pitt. Bus. Working Paper Aug. 30 2011).
106 See AIPN 2012 JOA, at arts. 5.1–.13; AMPLA 2011 JOA, at cl. 5.1–.8; UKOOA 2009 
JOA, at cl. 9.1–.10.
107 RMMLF Form 1, at art. 7.1; RMMLF Form 2, at art. 14.1.
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that “a meeting shall be called by Unit Operator upon written request of 
any Party . . . .”108
Using an operating committee undoubtedly raises the risk that an opera-
tor will be held to have a fiduciary obligation to the non-operators, which 
no operator wants, as well as the risk that the operator and non-operators 
will be jointly and severally liable to third parties.109 The greater the con-
trol of the non-operators is, the greater the risk is that the parties will not 
be treated as cotenants.110 To some degree, this risk can be minimized by 
careful drafting; all of the model forms contain similar provisions disclaim-
ing the existence of a partnership, denying the intention to create a joint 
venture or mining partnership, and purporting to negate any fiduciary 
relationship.111 But whatever the risk of being classified as joint venturers 
or mining partners, the changes in the technologies and economics of the 
industry may require more cooperative decision making than the current 
AAPL forms provide for. Including an option for an operating committee 
in the new model form is one way to open the door to more cooperation.
[c] Provide for Consultation
Alternatively, AAPL’s drafting committee should consider imposing a 
consultation obligation on the operator. While any interaction between the 
operator and non-operators may give support to third-party claims of joint 
and several liability, the exposure from consultation is minimal.
Several of the model forms contain mandatory-consultation language. 
The CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure, which contains no provision for an 
operating committee, nonetheless provides for mandatory consultation:
108 RMMLF Form 1, at art. 7.3; RMMLF Form 2, at art. 14.3. RMMLF Form 1 provides 
for a negotiated percentage of participating interest to make the call, while RMMLF Form 
2 states that “any Party having voting power on any matter to be considered” may call for 
a meeting.
109 As discussed in § 27.01, supra, one of the reasons for using an operating agreement is 
to minimize the risk of the parties being regarded as a joint venture, owing fiduciary duties 
to each other and being jointly and severally liable to others. See Ernest E. Smith, “The 
Operator: Liability to Non-Operators, Resignation, Removal and Selection of a Successor,” 
Oil & Gas Agreements: Joint Operations 2-1, 2-4 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 2008).
110 Boigon & Murphy, supra note 3, at 159 (noting that in mining partnership cases, 
mutual control often proves most important in determining whether an enterprise consti-
tutes a joint venture).
111 See AAPL Form 610-1989, at arts. V.A, VII.A; AIPN 2012 JOA, at art. 14.1; AMPLA 
2011 JOA, at cl. 3.3(f), 3.4(d); CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure, at cl. 1.5; RMMLF Form 
2, at art. 28.2; UKOOA 2009 JOA, at cl. 22.2.1; 2002 AAPL Offshore JOA, at art. 19.1; 2007 
AAPL Deepwater JOA, at art. 22.1. See also Smith, supra note 109, at 2-4; Pierce, supra note 
6, at 1-20 to 1-21.
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The Operator will consult with the Parties periodically about the exploration, 
development and operation of the Joint Lands, the construction, installation and 
operation of any Production Facility and management of the Joint Property. It 
will keep them informed in a timely manner about Joint Operations planned or 
conducted by it. Subject to this Agreement, the Parties delegate to the Operator, 
on their behalf, management of the exploration, development and operation of 
the Joint Lands and management of the other Joint Property.112
And both the 2002 AAPL Offshore JOA and the 2007 AAPL Deepwater 
JOA contain a similar, but more general provision: “unless otherwise pro-
vided in this agreement, the operator shall consult with the non-operating 
parties and keep them informed of important matters.”113 RMMLF Form 2 
also has similar language:
In the conduct of operations hereunder, Unit Operator shall: . . . Consult freely 
with the Parties within the area affected by any operation hereunder and keep 
them advised of all matters arising in operations hereunder which Unit Operator 
deems important, in the exercise of its best judgment.114
[d] Provide an Option for Secondment
Another concept adopted in the AIPN model forms in the 2002 and 
2012 versions that the AAPL drafting committee should include as an 
option in a new model form is secondment. “Secondment” means “place-
ment . . . of an employee of a Non-Operator or its Affiliate in Operator’s 
organization . . . .”115 Under the AIPN forms, it is limited in use to “situ-
ations requiring particular expertise or involving projects of a technical, 
operational or economically challenging nature.”116
[T]he concept of Secondment [is that] Non-Operator personnel with particular 
expertise and experience are integrated into the Operator’s organization for the 
limited purpose of conducting a particularly complex Joint Operation . . . [as] 
a way to enhance the Operator’s technical capabilities without diluting overall 
accountability and the Operator’s responsibility for Joint Operations.117
Secondment also provides non-operators “inside information” about the 
joint operations, though it is usual to restrict confidential information to 
that to which the non-operator is entitled under the JOA, and may facilitate 
a smoother working relationship between the operator and non-operators. 
The AMPLA 2011 JOA contains a broader secondment provision in clause 
112 CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure, at cl. 3.2A. The UKOOA 2009 JOA has consulta-
tion language at clause 6.9 in addition to the provision for an operating committee.
113 2002 AAPL Offshore JOA, at art. 5.2; 2007 AAPL Deepwater JOA, at art. 5.2.
114 RMMLF Form 2, at art. 16.1.D. RMMLF Form 1 has similar language at article 9.1.C.
115 AIPN 2012 JOA, at art. 1.1 [Alternative No. 3].
116 Id. at art. 4.3.C.
117 Weems & Bolton, supra note 65, at 3.
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7.8, which permits the operator to request or a non-operator to nomi-
nate “suitable management and technical personnel for particular Joint 
Operations,” though neither the operator nor a non-operator is required 
to accept or provide any proposed secondee.118 The UKOOA 2009 JOA is 
particularly well formulated and flexible, in this author’s opinion:
Secondment
6.11.1  The Participants agree that in certain circumstances a collaborative 
effort between them may be beneficial to Joint Operations. Such col-
laborative effort may include the secondment by a Non-Operator of 
personnel to the Operator’s organisation:
  (a)  to work on a term assignment as a member of a project team; or
  (b)  to fill organisational positions;
   in respect of Joint Operations. The length of any assignment shall be 
agreed between the Non-Operator and the Operator. Notwithstand-
ing the foregoing, the Non-Operator shall have the right on giving 
three (3) months notice, to withdraw its employee from any such 
assignment.
   The Operator shall have the right to require the removal of any person 
seconded to its organisation for reasonable cause.
6.11.2  In respect of any person seconded to the Operator’s organisation 
under clause 6.11.1 for the period of such secondment:
  (a)  such person shall remain the employee of the Participant which 
seconded him and such Participant shall remain responsible 
for all the legal obligations of an employer associated with such 
employment;
  (b)  all costs associated with the employment of such person (includ-
ing salary and employee benefits) and all costs associated with 
his secondment to the organisation of the Operator shall be 
chargeable to the Joint Account; and
  (c)  all work undertaken by such person shall be Joint Operations 
and accordingly the Operator shall retain overall responsibility 
for such work and such person (and the Participant which sec-
onded him) shall benefit from all indemnities and limitations of 
liability applying to the Operator hereunder, including those set 
forth in clause 6.2.4 in relation to such work.119
§ 27.03 Operator Removal—Is Gross Negligence or Willful 
Misconduct Necessary to Justify Removal?
The practical remedy provided to non-operators by all the model form 
operating agreements for bad behavior by an operator is operator removal. 
118 AMPLA 2011 JOA, at cl. 7.8(b).
119 UKOOA 2009 JOA, at cl. 6.11.
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But under the model forms, once a party has been designated as operator, 
it is not easily removed. Difficulty of removal, like limited liability, follows 
from the relationship of the operator and non-operators. The operator 
serves to facilitate the goals of the economic partnership of the working 
interest owners, rather than as a for-hire administrator. The operator does 
not make a profit or collect fees as operator. The operator is at risk, just like 
everybody else involved in the venture. So the operator ought to be pro-
tected against removal, as well as liability, except in unusual circumstances.
[1] Provisions of the AAPL Model Forms
The first AAPL model form, AAPL Form 610-1956, provided for change 
of operator only when the operator sold all of its interest in the Contract 
Area or resigned; under the 1956 model form, once a working interest 
owner was elected operator it remained operator as long as it owned any 
interest in the Unit Area, unless it chose to resign. Many thought that the 
1956 form was too rigid, that some provision for operator removal was 
desirable.120
The three later versions of the AAPL model form permit non-operators 
to remove the operator, but only for cause and after process. The 1977 and 
1982 model forms provided in article V.B.1 that “Operator may be removed 
if it fails or refuses to carry out its duties hereunder.”121 As Robert Bledsoe 
commented, “ ‘[f]ailure or refusal to carry out [its] duties’ is a fertile area 
for evidentiary development . . . .”122
An interpretative problem with the 1977 and 1982 forms was whether 
the reference to “fails or refuses to carry out its duties” requires non-
operators to show that the operator has been grossly negligent or guilty of 
willful misconduct in order to justify removal. To this author, the reference 
to “duties” is broader than the obligation imposed to conduct operations 
in a “good and workmanlike manner,” to which the terms of the excul-
patory language apply, but the argument was raised in operator-removal 
120 See, e.g., Young, supra note 9, at 219. The Foundation’s first form, RMMLF Form 1, 
had no operator-removal provision either.
121 The 1977 and 1982 forms differed as to the percentage the non-operators had to 
control. The 1977 form required “the affirmative vote of two (2) or more Non-Operators 
owning a majority interest based on ownership as shown on Exhibit ‘A’, and not on the 
number of parties remaining after excluding the voting interest of Operator.” AAPL Form 
610-1977, at art. V.B.1. The 1982 form provided for “the affirmative vote of two (2) or more 
Non-Operators owning a majority interest based on ownership as shown on Exhibit ‘A’ 
remaining after excluding the voting interest of Operator.” AAPL Form 610-1982, at art. 
V.B.1.
122 Bledsoe, supra note 26, at 8-5.
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litigation,123 and several commentators have noted it: “[t]he combination 
of ‘for cause’ removal clauses along with such a high standard of liability 
under the AAPL 1977 and 1982 forms makes an operator virtually removal 
proof . . . .”124
AAPL Form 610-1989 clarified the standards and process for for-cause 
removal of the operator by requiring notice and an opportunity for cure, 
and by replacing the “fails or refuses to carry out its duties” language with 
removal for “good cause,” which is defined broadly, to make it clear that the 
operator-removal standard was a lower threshold than “gross negligence or 
willful misconduct”:
Operator may be removed only for good cause by the affirmative vote of Non-
Operators owning a majority interest based on ownership as shown on Exhibit 
“A” remaining after excluding the voting interest of Operator; such vote shall not 
be deemed effective until a written notice has been delivered to the Operator 
by a Non-Operator detailing the alleged default and Operator has failed to cure 
the default within thirty (30) days from its receipt of the notice or, if the default 
concerns an operation then being conducted, within forty-eight (48) hours of its 
receipt of the notice. For purposes hereof, “good cause” shall mean not only gross 
negligence or willful misconduct but also the material breach of or inability to meet 
the standards of operation contained in Article V.A. or material failure or inability 
to perform its obligations under this agreement.125
[2] Provisions of Other Model Forms
Several of the model forms address the issue of whether operator removal 
requires a showing of gross negligence or willful misconduct, at least indi-
rectly. RMMLF Form 2’s language relating to operator removal is similar 
to that in the 1977 and 1982 AAPL model forms, but authorizes removal 
for breach of “duties or obligations,” rather than just “duties,” which may be 
sufficient to avoid the issue of whether the breach must rise to the level of 
“gross negligence or willful misconduct”:
Upon default or failure in performance of its duties or obligations under the Unit 
Agreement, Unit Operator may be removed by the Approval of the Parties after 
excluding the voting interest of the Unit Operator, and the Parties shall, or any 
123 See Tri-Star Petroleum Co. v. Tipperary Corp., 101 S.W.3d. 583, 589–90 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 2003, pet. denied); R & R Res. Corp. v. Echelon Oil & Gas, L.L.C., No. 03-05-00479-
CV, 2006 WL 66458, at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 10, 2006) (mem. op.).
124 Brian R. Bjella, “Removing the Operator Under the Joint Operating Agreement: 
Breaking Up Is Hard to Do,” 45 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 11-1, 11-21 (1999) (citing Milam 
Randolph Pharo, “Duties and Obligations Revisited—Who Bears What Risk of Loss?” The 
Oil and Gas Joint Operating Agreement 4-1, 4-16 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 1990)).
125 AAPL Form 610-1989, at art. V.B.1 (emphasis added). Article V.D lists rights and 
duties of the operator, and article XV.D also provides that “the failure of any party to this 
agreement to comply with all of its financial obligations provided herein shall be a material 
default.” That failure to pay bills is a material breach is implicit in all the JOA forms, though 
it is best made express.
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Party may, promptly give written notice to the Unit Operator of such Approval 
of the Parties to remove the Unit Operator detailing the default or failure in 
performance.126
The 2002 AAPL Offshore JOA permits operator removal where there is a 
“substantial breach of a material provision,”127 undoubtedly on the theory 
that gross negligence or willful misconduct would meet that standard, 
while “substantial breach of a material provision” would not require gross 
negligence or willful misconduct. The provisions of the CAPL 2007 Oper-
ating Procedure and the AMPLA 2011 JOA are similar. The CAPL 2007 
Operating Procedure provides that:
The Operator will be replaced and another Operator appointed . . . if:
. . . .
(b)  the Operator defaults in performance of any of its duties or obligations 
hereunder . . . and does not begin to remedy diligently that default within 
30 days after receiving a bona fide notice from Parties holding a major-
ity of the Working Interests (excluding those of the Operator and any of 
its Affiliates that are Parties), specifying the default in sufficient detail to 
enable the Operator to understand its nature and requiring the Operator to 
remedy it, provided that the Operator will be replaced immediately by an 
interim Operator . . . if those duties or obligations must be fulfilled sooner 
to protect life, property or the environment . . . .128
The counterpart provision in the AMPLA 2011 JOA addresses operator 
removal in terms of the duration of the operator’s appointment. It states 
that the operator’s appointment ends when “the Operator commits a Breach 
Default Event and fails to remedy the default within 60 days of receipt of a 
written notice of default served by a Participant.”129
Better to be sure. The 2007 AAPL Deepwater JOA avoids the issue by 
making either a finding of gross negligence or willful misconduct or “sub-
stantial breach of a material provision” of the contract that is not timely 
cured cause for removal.130 And the UKOOA 2009 JOA provides both 
that the joint operating committee may remove the operator at the end 
of any month if “the Operator has committed any material breach of, or 
failed to observe or perform any material obligation on its part contained 
126 RMMLF Form 2, at art 17.2.B (emphasis added).
127 2002 AAPL Offshore JOA, at art. 4.4(c).
128 CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure, at cl. 2.3B (emphasis added). As discussed below, 
even the reference to default of “any” of the operator’s duties or obligations will require the 
showing of a material breach.
129 AMPLA 2011 JOA, at cl. 6.2(d). “Breach Default Event” is defined to include the 
“Operator committing a material breach of any of its material obligations under this agree-
ment . . . .” Id. at cl. 1.1.
130 See 2007 AAPL Deepwater JOA, at art. 4.4.2(a), (b).
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in, this Agreement,”131 and for an option for immediate removal for “Wil-
ful Misconduct.”132 Additionally, there is a note that “if these words [the 
option for immediate removal] are deleted then any Wilful Misconduct is 
assumed also to be a breach of the Operator’s obligations under the JOA 
which would justify removal under 5.3.1,” which makes clear that material 
breach of a material obligation need not rise to willful misconduct.
[3] The Operator-Removal Process
Ultimately, whether there is “cause” for operator removal is a fact ques-
tion.133 Under the usual principles of contract interpretation, to support 
removal of an operator by non-operators, the operator’s breach must be 
material—a failure to conduct operations in a “good and workmanlike 
manner,” a significant breach of contract duties, or some tortious conduct. 
Further, materiality must be judged in context, considering the particular 
breach in light of all of circumstances, including the totality of the opera-
tor’s duties under the agreement. The operating agreement specifies many 
of the duties of the operator, but it also provides that the operator has the 
duty to “conduct and direct and have full control of all operations” and that 
“it shall conduct all such operations in a good and workmanlike manner.” 
A single act might be so egregious that it would constitute grounds for 
removal, for instance, if the operator committed an outright act of theft. 
On the other hand, insignificant breaches of the operating agreement, 
such as sending out billing statements a few days late, would not consti-
tute grounds for removal. Whether there is cause for operator removal is 
a question of the materiality of the breach when considered in light of all 
of the functions performed by the operator in furthering the goals of the 
project and in carrying out its contractual duties. As Howard Boigon has 
observed, what those seeking to remove an operator must do is “prove that 
the operator’s conduct is not within the latitude normally accepted by the 
industry.”134
Proof of the failure or refusal of an operator to perform its duties under 
the operating agreement, particularly in light of the operator’s obligation 
131 UKOOA 2009 JOA, at cl. 5.3.1(a).
132 Id. at cl. 5.3.2(i).
133 See Robert C. Bledsoe, “Operating Agreements from the Standpoint of the Nonopera-
tor,” Advanced Oil, Gas & Mineral L. Inst. (State Bar of Tex. Oct. 1985) (“[The meaning of 
‘failure or refusal to carry out duties’] presents a fact issue . . . .”). See also Bledsoe, supra 
note 26, at § 8.02.
134 Howard L. Boigon, “The Joint Operating Agreement in a Hostile Environment,” 38 
Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax’n 5-1, 5-28 (Sw. Legal Fdn. 1987). Boigon was a principal drafter 
of the AAPL Form 610-1989.
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to perform in a “good and workmanlike manner,” generally requires tes-
timony of industry norm and custom. Whether or not the operator has 
adhered to the standard of performance reasonably expected of operators 
under similar circumstances is not a matter within the common under-
standing of a jury.
Many have thought that the standard for operator removal is objec-
tive, ultimately to be determined by a court, rather than by the subjective 
determination of the non-operators. Tri-Star Petroleum Co. v. Tipperary 
Corp.135 is to the contrary, however. There a Texas-based operator, Tri-Star 
Petroleum Company (Tri-Star), and Australian non-operators used the 
AAPL Form 610-1977 with a COPAS Model Form Accounting Procedure 
to operate a 2.3-million-acre coalbed gas project in Queensland, Austra-
lia. The non-operators voted to remove Tri-Star, alleging both account-
ing and operational defaults. Tri-Star refused to step aside. Tipperary, the 
newly elected operator, went to court in Texas and obtained a temporary 
injunction requiring Tri-Star to hand over operations. Tri-Star then filed 
an accelerated interlocutory appeal. One of Tri-Star’s arguments was that 
the trial court had erred by granting a temporary injunction without deter-
mining that Tri-Star had failed or refused to perform its duties as opera-
tor under the JOA.136 Tri-Star argued that a judicial determination was a 
condition precedent to the removal of an operator.137 The appellate court 
considered the evidence that had been presented to the trial court, includ-
ing both accounting and operational defaults, perhaps the worst of which 
was that Tri-Star’s failures had required the venturers to relinquish parts of 
the “Authority to Prospect” from Queensland. The appellate court stated 
that “the trial court could [properly] conclude that the JOA provisions 
were unambiguous and thus its terms should be given their plain, ordinary, 
and generally accepted meaning.”138 Effectively, the court interpreted the 
AAPL Form 610-1977 provisions to permit the non-operators to deter-
mine whether cause existed for operator removal.139
135 101 S.W.3d. 583 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, pet. denied).
136 Id. at 590.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Brad Moody has characterized the two positions as “will of the court” and “will of 
the majority.” See M. Bradford Moody, “Removing An Uncooperative Operator Under the 
Model 610 Form Operating Agreement,” 34 Oil, Gas & Energy Res. L. Sec. Rep. 39, 50 (State 
Bar of Tex. 2010).
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The underlying logic of Tri-Star is attractive: the parties who enter into 
one of the model forms contractually agree that non-operators have the 
right to determine whether cause exists under the circumstances. So long 
as there is no indication that the non-operators have acted in bad faith or 
unreasonably, there is no reason that judicial confirmation of their action 
should be necessary. The fact remains, however, that there is no express 
obligation under any of the AAPL model forms that the operator give up 
operational control if it does not agree that cause existed for the removal 
vote, so that operator-removal votes are likely to end up before the courts, 
as was the case in Tri-Star. Until a court has ruled, the operator generally 
continues to function in that capacity.140
And when courts rule, they often find in favor of the operator. Gifford 
Operating Co. v. Indrex, Inc.141 illustrates the point.142 There, non-operators 
owning a majority of the working interest voted to remove the operator.143 
The opinion notes operational defects alleged by the non-operators.144 
The court observed that the operator “must be free to exercise [its] good 
judgment”145 and can be removed only if it “has failed to operate the well 
in a good and workmanlike manner.”146 The court found that the operator 
had operated the well in a good and workmanlike manner and thus could 
not be removed, notwithstanding the majority vote of the working interest 
owners who had asserted they had grounds for removal.147
Whether or not there is cause for removal, the process can be bloody, 
as Tri-Star illustrates. “A vote to remove an operator will likely result in a 
declaratory judgment action that will not be satisfactory to either party.”148 
140 The reason may be pride. But it may also be economics. An operator has a financial 
interest in continuing as operator, as discussed at § 27.01, supra.
141 No. 2:89-CV-0189, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22505 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 1992) (unreported).
142 So does Tri-Star. Even though the court found that the non-operators had properly 
removed the operator, the operator continued to operate until the court ruled.
143 Gifford, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22505, at *4–5.
144 See id. at *3–4 (alleging negligence in the design and execution of the fracture 
treatment).
145 Id. at *3.
146 Id. at *4.
147 Id. at *5.
148 Bjella, supra note 124, at 11-21 (citing Pharo, supra note 124, at 4-17).
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Even if non-operators seek expedited injunctive relief, the litigation may 
take years and cost a lot of money to resolve.149
[4] Suggestions for the Drafters
[a] Make the Operator-Removal Provisions More 
Certain
A possible expediting solution would be to include a provision in the 
operating agreement that follows the court’s reasoning in Tri-Star, mak-
ing it clearer that determination whether good cause exists to remove an 
operator is an appropriate function of the non-operators acting in good 
faith. Arthur Wright has suggested that non-operators should insert lan-
guage in article V.B.1 of the operating agreement that reads:
A judicial determination that good cause exists for removal of the Operator 
shall not be a condition precedent to the removal of the Operator for good cause 
becoming effective, provided that an Operator removed for good cause shall be 
deemed reinstated as Operator if and when a valid judgment, which holds that 
good cause did not exist for such removal, becomes final and non-appealable. 
The Non-Operators would suffer irreparable harm if the removal of an Operator 
for good cause is not made effective as provided above and the Non-Operators 
shall be entitled to injunctive relief or other equitable relief to enforce any such 
removal of Operator.150
Wright also suggests that the “good cause” definition in article V.B.1 be 
modified to include “material failure or inability to perform its obligations, 
duties, or responsibilities under this agreement.”151 That change would more 
clearly include the “duties” of the operator listed in article V.D of the AAPL 
Form 610-1989.152 Both changes would discourage litigation over how the 
operator-removal process is supposed to work.
Finally, the drafting committee should consider providing specifically 
that non-operators who seek to remove an operator will face no liability.153 
The CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure has such a provision:
149 The non-operators’ vote to remove Tri-Star was in 1999. The decision of the court of 
appeals was in 2003.
Professor Bruce Kramer and I once spent three days sequestered in a federal court house 
waiting to testify (for opposing parties) in an operator-removal case. Killing time, we 
calculated that the total of the likely charges for the lawyers and experts involved in the case 
substantially exceeded any damages.
150 Wright, supra note 78, at 7-16.
151 Id. at 7-17.
152 “ ‘Rights and Duties’ might be considered to be different from ‘obligations.’ ” Moody, 
supra note 139, at 42.
153 In Tri-Star Petroleum Co. v. Tipperary Corp., 101 S.W.3d. 583 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, 
pet. denied), Tri-Star asserted a barrage of claims against those who sought to remove it.
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No Recourse For Removal-An Operator that resigns or is replaced in accordance 
with this Article will not have any claim or recourse against the other Parties 
because of its resignation or replacement.154
[b] Provide an Option for Removal Without Cause
An alternative that AAPL’s drafting committee should consider is to give 
non-operators the option to remove the operator without cause. Many 
model forms include such an option, though it may be used infrequently 
and the details of how it works differ. The first draft of what became the 
AAPL Form 610-1989 included an optional provision providing that non-
operators might remove an operator without cause by a majority vote, 
which was roundly criticized by large companies and dropped from the 
final version.155 A removal-without-cause provision is included in the 2007 
CAPL Operating Procedure, however, keyed to non-operators owning at 
least 60% of the working interest:
Delayed Replacement-The Operator will be replaced and another Operator 
appointed . . . if:
(a) at least two Parties holding at least 60% of the Working Interests agree, by 
notice to the other Parties (including as a single Party for this purpose any 
Affiliate thereof that is a Party), to replace the Operator, provided that a 
single Party holding at least a 60% Working Interest may, by notice to the 
other Parties, become the Operator hereunder, unless it: (i) would then be 
subject to immediate replacement under Subclause 2.02A[156]; or (ii) is 
then subject to a bona fide notice of default under Clause 5.05.157
154 CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure, at cl. 2.6F. So does the UKOOA 2009 JOA:
The Operator shall have no claim against the Participants as a consequence of 
the . . . removal of the Operator but such . . . removal shall be without prejudice 
to any rights, obligations or liabilities which accrued during the period when the 
Operator acted as such.
UKOOA 2009 JOA, at cl. 5.4.
155 See Derman, supra note 47, at 185; John Burritt McArthur, “Coming of Age: Initiating 
the Oilfield into Performance Disclosure,” 50 SMU L. Rev. 663, 748 (1997).
156 Clause 2.02A provides for immediate replacement of a bankrupt or insolvent opera-
tor. Unlike the counterpart provision in the AAPL model contracts, it defines insolvency, 
as being “unable to pay its debts as they fall due in the usual course of business or if it does 
not have sufficient assets to satisfy its cumulative liabilities in full.” CAPL 2007 Operat-
ing Procedure, at cl. 2.3A(a). In Tri-Star Resources Ltd. v. J.C. International Petroleum Ltd. 
(1986), 48 Alta. L.R. 2d 355, [1987] 2 W.W.R. 141 (Can. Alta. Q.B.), the court found that the 
appointment of a receiver for the operator was sufficient to trigger the automatic removal 
provisions of an earlier version of the CAPL form. But a definition of “insolvency” is prefer-
able, and should be added by the drafting committee.
157 CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure, at cl. 2.3B. Clause 5.05 provides for interest, sus-
pension from the venture, and ultimate removal of a defaulting non-operator.
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The UKOOA 2009 JOA has a similar provision, but the percentage of 
ownership necessary to replace an operator is negotiated.158 The AIPN 
2012 JOA straightforwardly provides an optional provision that an
Operator may be removed at any time without cause by the affirmative vote of 
________ (______) or more of the total number of Non-Operators, excluding 
Affiliates of the Operator, holding at least ________ percent (______%) of the 
combined Participating Interest of such Non-Operators.159
The 2002 AAPL Offshore JOA and the 2007 AAPL Deepwater JOA permit 
operator removal when the operator no longer owns the largest interest.
If the Operator assigns part of its Working Interest (excluding an interest assigned 
to an Affiliate) and the assignment reduces the Operator’s Working Interest to 
less than the Working Interest of a Non-Operating Party, whether accomplished 
by one or more assignments, then the removal of the Operator requires approval 
by Vote.160
The removal-without-cause option is rarely chosen in international 
operations because host-government agreements commonly require gov-
ernment approval for a change of operator,161 and often the operator is the 
only investor party to the host-government contract to have experience, 
personnel, and equipment in the country. But removal without cause has 
a place in domestic operations, where mineral-owner-approval require-
ments are unusual and operational logistics are easier. An optional provi-
sion for operator removal without cause should be included in the AAPL 
Form 610 revision for the same reasons that it is included in the AIPN 2012 
JOA. First, it is logical: “if one can intellectually conclude, or make the leap 
of faith, that an Operator should be working for the benefit of all of the co-
adventurers, why should the Non-Operators not have the power to remove 
their Operator?”162 Second, where chosen, the possibility of removal of 
the operator without cause will help establish a cooperative relationship 
between operator and non-operators: “the authority to remove will tend to 
restrain the Operator from becoming too creative in charging its internal 
costs, and will tend to cause the Operator to be attentive to the balance of 
its wants and needs with those of the Non-Operators.”163 The mere pres-
158 UKOOA 2009 JOA, at cl. 5.3.1(b).
159 AIPN 2012 JOA, at art. 4.10.E.
160 2007 AAPL Deepwater JOA, at art. 4.4.1. See also 2002 AAPL Offshore JOA, at art. 
4.4(c).
161 See Ernest E. Smith et al., International Petroleum Transactions 615 (Rocky Mt. Min. 
L. Fdn. 3d ed. 2010). Investors rarely want to rock the investment boat by asking for govern-
ment approval of an operator change.
162 Derman & Barnes, supra note 98, at 4-39.
163 Id.
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ence of the option in the model form may help set a healthier tone for the 
relationship of operator and non-operator.
Additionally, providing the non-operators with an option to remove 
an operator whose interest falls below an agreed percentage of the whole 
makes good sense; it is in every participant’s interest that the operator has 
“skin in the game.”164
[c] Provide Options to Facilitate Renegotiation of 
the Operating Agreement
There are several practical problems with the remedy of operator removal. 
One is that it is often not feasible for the non-operators to take over opera-
tions or to locate a competent contract operator; change of operator is 
likely to be an expensive process, particularly if it is done with short notice 
and in the midst of disagreements. Second, because oil and gas exploration 
and development is risky as well as expensive, the working interest owners 
share an interest in continuity in operations with the operator; change may 
bring mistakes and raise costs for everyone. And third, as discussed above, 
an operator removed for cause often will dispute the existence of cause and 
simply refuse to go, throwing the issue into the courts.
In this context, the drafting committee should also consider provisions 
that might facilitate adjustment of operations short of operator removal, 
by permitting renegotiation of provisions of the operating agreement that 
may strain relations between the operator and the non-operators. Oil and 
gas production may last for decades, and there is a strong possibility that 
within that time there will be changes in company ownership, culture, 
operating circumstances, or economics that will make the parties’ original 
agreement unsatisfactory to at least some of the parties.
There are two provisions in the CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure that 
are particularly attractive in that they permit adjustment of the terms of 
the operating agreement and, potentially, a change of operator. The first is 
the operator-challenge process, which permits a non-operator to replace 
an operator in situations in which the terms the parties have agreed upon 
turn out to be unattractive to the non-operators. The CAPL 2007 Operat-
ing Procedure provides that:
A.  Challenge Notice-At any time after a Party has been the Operator for a con-
tinuous period of at least 2 years, any Non-Operator may give notice (the 
“Challenge Notice”) to the other Parties that it is prepared to conduct Joint 
Operations on more favourable terms and conditions. It will include in the 
Challenge Notice sufficient detail to enable the other Parties to evaluate 
the nature of the Challenge Notice and the effect the revised terms and 
conditions would have on Joint Operations. Within 60 days after receipt of 
164 See supra note 28.
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the Challenge Notice, the Operator will notify the Parties if it is prepared to 
operate on the terms and conditions set out therein. If it is, it will promptly 
proceed to do so, and Subclause 2.03B [dealing with removal for cause] will 
apply to it, mutatis mutandis. If it is not, it will resign as Operator effective 
not later than 45 days after that 60 day period. The Operator will be deemed 
to resign if it fails to deliver such a notice within that 60 day period.
B.  Successor Operates Under Challenge Notice-If the Operator resigns under 
Subclause 2.03A, a successor will be appointed under Clause 2.06, provided 
that the Party that served the Challenge Notice will become the new Opera-
tor if no other Party is prepared to operate on the terms and conditions set 
out herein. The new Operator will conduct Joint Operations on the basis set 
forth in the Challenge Notice. Any costs in excess of those set out therein in 
the 2 year period after becoming the Operator will be for its sole account. 
Notwithstanding Clause 2.04 (but subject to Clause 2.09), the new Operator 
may not resign until it has acted as Operator for at least 2 years.165
In other words, a non-operator that successfully challenges an operator 
must “put up or pay up”; it is responsible for all excessive costs for the next 
two years.
The second provision, a counterbalance to the operator-challenge provi-
sion, permits the operator to request modification of the terms and condi-
tions of the operating procedure to its advantage and to the disadvantage 
of the non-operators:
A Party that has been the Operator for a continuous period of 2 years may give 
notice (“Operator’s Notice”) to the Non Operators of the revised terms and condi-
tions on which it would continue as Operator, provided that an Operator operat-
ing under a previous Operator’s Notice may not serve another Operator’s Notice 
until the previous one has been effective for at least 2 years. Within 60 days after 
receipt of the Operator’s Notice, each Non-Operator will notify the Operator if 
it agrees to the Operator operating under those revised terms and conditions. A 
Non-Operator that fails to respond within that period will be deemed to agree to 
those revised terms and conditions. A Non-Operator that does not agree must 
give notice (“Counter Proposal”) to the other Parties of the terms and conditions 
upon which it would serve as the Operator. Any such Counter Proposal will be 
deemed to be a challenge of the Operator. Clause 2.03 will apply, mutatis mutan-
dis, as if it were a Challenge Notice, except that the Counter-Proposal will be 
compared to the terms and conditions proposed in the Operator’s Notice. If no 
Party serves a Counter-Proposal, the Operator will thereafter operate under the 
Operator’s Notice, with any excess costs for its sole account. Notwithstanding 
Clause 2.04 (but subject to Clause 2.09), it may not resign until it has operated for 
at least 2 years under any Operator’s Notice that becomes effective.166
Taken together, these two provisions are similar to the “Push/Pull” provi-
sions sometimes found in partnership agreements, or “baseball arbitration.”
A fair criticism of these provisions is that they are unlikely to be help-
ful to non-operators with small interests. But the reality is that it is large 
165 CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure, at cl. 2.4.
166 Id. at cl. 2.5.
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interest owners that are likely to be operators, and to implement the pro-
visions. The parties to any contract can always renegotiate that contract, 
but making renegotiation a contract right brings a salutary certainty to the 
process.
§ 27.04 Conclusion
The analysis above teaches several lessons. One is that the structure of 
model form operating agreements around the world is surprisingly uni-
form. That should not be surprising, for though local law and culture may 
require tweaks in the details, the purposes of an operating agreement and 
the problems investors confront finding and producing oil and gas are much 
the same wherever exploration and production occur. A second lesson is 
that AAPL’s onshore model forms are “dated”; they have been overtaken by 
both precedents and changes in technology and business structures.167 It is 
high time to consider changes.168 And third, the analysis shows that some 
of the newer model forms, in particular, contain useful ideas—and even 
more importantly, language to implement them—that might be embraced 
by AAPL’s drafting committee. It may be true that there is “nothing new 
under the sun” when it comes to the structure and drafting of operating 
agreements.169 But we can learn from what others have done, and the com-
parative analysis above demonstrates vividly that different words or word 
structures may make a difference in meaning.
Operating agreements, like leases and deeds, are instruments of private 
law. While the words parties choose to express their intent will always 
be subject to interpretation in the context of the circumstances of the 
agreement,170 there is no good reason for courts to intervene to rewrite 
167 A thoughtful and incisive analysis of changes in the business structure caused by the 
development of unconventional resources is found at David H. Sweeney et al., “Fractur-
ing Relationships—The Impact of Risk and Risk Allocation on Unconventional Oil & Gas 
Projects,” 65 Inst. on Oil & Gas L. 6-1 (Ctr. for Am. & Int’l L. 2014).
168 There are many “recurring issues” in operating agreements. As I noted in my pre-
sentation at the Annual Institute, I began this chapter thinking I could review a long list, 
quickly cut it to five, and end by writing about just two, due to time and space constraints.
169 Ecclesiastes 1:4-11. For example, the operator-challenge provisions from the CAPL 
model form that I discussed favorably in the last section were called “ ‘challenge’ or ‘flip-
flop’ clauses” by Joe Young when he wrote more than 40 years ago. Young, supra note 9, at 
219.
170 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The Theory of Legal Interpretation,” 12 Harv. L. Rev. 
417, 417–18 (1899).
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the agreements of the parties.171 The challenge for the model form draft-
ers, then, is to understand clearly what effects they seek to attain, and 
then to pick words that clearly express those results. That is particularly 
true of committee-drafted contracts, which may lack the focus of drafters 
negotiating head-to-head, and an important reason to consider including 
alternative provisions as options; let the parties make the final decisions.
171 This is a common theme in oil and gas jurisprudence. See Heritage Res., Inc. v. 
NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 131 (Tex. 1996) (an important case involving interpretation 
of a lease royalty clause) (citing Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex. 1981); 
Tex. Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 871 (Tex. 1968)). See also Foster v. Atl. Ref. 
Co., 329 F.2d 485, 490 (5th Cir. 1964).
